Article 2 of the treaty relates to the joint development of defence plans; Training of personnel on the ground and defence against nuclear weapons; the exchange of information and the assessment of hostile capabilities; The development of nuclear vector systems and the research, development and construction of military reactors.  The treaty requires the exchange of classified information on nuclear weapons when the communicating party finds, after consultation with the other party, that disclosure of this information is necessary to improve the recipient`s ability to develop and manufacture nuclear weapons.  The United States would transmit information on British nuclear weapons. In the immediate future, this would exclude information on thermonuclear weapons.  Confidential information issues are also covered by the agreement. The UK government has not published these sections “due to the need for high confidentiality and the use that such information would be intended for other potential nuclear states. In other words, it could very well contribute to the dissemination.  Security at one point, computer codes, metallurgical and manufacturing technology for beryllium, uranium and plutonium, uranium corrosion in the presence of water and water vapour, underground efficiency tests, space tests, secret tests, lithium connection technology, explosives, deuterium monitors, plutonium fire extinction, high-speed cameras, mechanical decay, , mood sensors, neutron sources, tritium tanks, telemetry, hydrodynamic and shock in case of spherical and cylindrical symmetry problems, sections of nuclear sections, radiochemistry, atomic demolition ammunition, hardening of the explosive head, asymmetric detonation, response to the nuclear terrorist threat, nuclear accidents and waste management.  The successful development of British thermonuclear weapons came at an opportune time to resume negotiations with the Americans. The launch of Sputnik 1 by the Soviet Union, the world`s first artificial satellite, on October 4, 1957, was a huge shock to American public opinion, which had believed that the technological superiority of the Americans ensured their invulnerability. Suddenly, there was indisputable evidence that the Soviet Union was indeed ahead, at least in some regions.
In widespread calls for action in response to the Sputnik crisis, U.S. and UK officials took the opportunity to steal their relationships.  At the suggestion of Harold Caccia, the United Kingdom`s ambassador to the United States, Macmillan wrote to Eisenhower on 10 October asking the two countries to pool their resources, as Macmillan put it, to meet the Soviet challenge on all fronts, “militaryly, economically and politically”.  On 12 November 2018, the British government forwarded Agreement 123 between the United States and the United Kingdom to Parliament and, later this month, the Nuclear Safeguards Regulations necessary to comply with the terms of Agreement 123. The 123 agreement is expected to enter into force on a date agreed by the United States and the United Kingdom through an exchange of diplomatic notes at ministerial level, which is expected to coincide with the UK`s withdrawal from Euratom. Therefore, we do not anticipate an interruption of nuclear trade between the United States and the United Kingdom. “It has often been said that the United States and the United Kingdom have a special relationship, and our cooperation in the field of nuclear defence is one of the pillars of that relationship,” said U.S. Energy Secretary Rick Perry.